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Case No. 20070967-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Corey Edward Harvell, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from an order of restitution in a conviction for attempted 
theft by receiving stolen property. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution where 
pecuniary damages were causally related to defendant's driving a stolen car and 
were sufficiently foreseeable to be recoverable in a civil action for conversion? 
Standard of Review. "Trial courts are vested with wide latitude and discretion 
in sentencing,... and we will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it 
exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Corbitt, 
2003 UT App 417, f 6,82 P.3d 211 (citations omitted). "'[T]he exercise of discretion 
in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the 
appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court/" Id. (quoting State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,887 (Utah 1978) (brackets in original). 
STATUTES1 
The following statutes at attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 2008); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2008); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-102, -302 (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, theft by receiving stolen property, and 
theft. Rl-2. Defendant pled guilty to attempted burglary, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), and 
attempted theft by receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (West 2004) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 
2008), third degree felonies. R23-38. The court dismissed the theft charge. R37-38. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent zero-to-five-year prison terms on the two 
1
 Citation is to current statutes. No alteration in statutes amended 
subsequent to the events at issue, however, affects disposition of the case. 
2 
offenses, to be served consecutively with terms imposed in two other cases.2 R69-
69A. 
At a hearing, defendant argued that he should not be ordered to pay 
restitution for brake repairs to the stolen car or for damage to an iPod left in the car 
because he was not legally responsible for those items—the repairs, he argued, were 
made long after the car was recovered and then driven, and he had not pled guilty 
to theft of the car, but only to attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R87:3-6, 
13-14. The court disagreed and ordered defendant to pay restitution of $763.24 to 
Cami Losee, whose stolen car defendant pled to receiving. R71. The $763.24 
represents restitution for brake repair—$539.24, a tank of gas—$25.00, and 
replacement of a Nano iPod--$199.00. R71; 87:16. 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the restitution order. R75. 
2
 This case was No. 071901648. R69. In case No. 061907673, defendant pled 
guilty to theft by deception, a third degree felony. R92:3. In case No. 071900347, 
defendant pled guilty to unlawful acquisition, possession or transfer of a financial 
transaction card and falsely making, coding, signing a financial transaction card, 
third degree felonies. Id. at 3. In yet another case, No. 071902287, defendant pled 
guilty to attempted theft, a third degree felony. Id. at 3. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
On February 7,2007, Cami Losee, left her Hyimdai Elantra at the residence of 
her friend, Hector Carillo, before she departed for a vacation in Italy. R45 (Letterrl), 
48 (Receipt:!.); 87:9;. Ms. Losee locked the doors of her car and gave the keys to Mr. 
Carillo, which he hung on rack in his residence. R45 (Letter:l). Her car "was 
running fine before [she] left" R46 (Letter:2). Sometime after midnight on February 
12, while Ms. Losee was away from Salt Lake City, Mr. Carillo's home was broken 
into, many of his valuables were taken, and Ms. Losee's car was stolen. R45 
(Letter:l); 87:9. 
On February 13, 2007, Gary Rigby returned to his home to find a silver 
Hyundai parked in front of his Salt Lake City home. R2. Mr. Rigby saw defendant 
"around his residence" and then "just walk[] inside." Id.; PSI:5. Mr. Rigby went 
inside his home and found it "ransacked": his clothes and belongings "were thrown 
all over," several drawers and cabinets looked as though they had been "gone 
through," and a new 27-inch flat screen TV and a carton of Winston 100 cigarettes 
The facts are taken from the probable cause statement (R2-3); the 
presentence investigation report (PSI) (R66); Ms. Losee's letter of June 10, 2007 
(Letter) (R45-46), an automotive repair receipt (Receipt) (R48), and an I-pod cost 
statement (Statement) (R49); see also Victim Information File ; and the evidence 
presented at the restitution hearing. R87. The letter, receipt, and statement are 
attached at Addendum B. 
4 
were missing. R2;PSI:5-6;R87:15-16. He immediately called 911. PSL6. Mr. Rigby 
then exited his home, where he accosted defendant. PSL5. Defendant claimed that 
he was a friend of Mr. Rigby's son. Id. Defendant then fled, but not before Mr. 
Rigby got the license number and a description of the Hyundai and defendant. Id.; 
R2. A short time later, an individual walking his dog near an apartment complex 
found a box of checks belonging to Mr. Rigby and called him. PSL6 
The police responded to the apartment complex, recovered the checks, and 
located the Hyundai, by now reported stolen. Id. At the apartment corresponding 
to the parking stall where the car was f ound, police spoke with the tenant, Robinetta 
Hill. Id. She initially denied any knowledge of the car. Id. The police returned to 
the car and found a Salt Lake County Sheriffs ankle monitor page and an 
identification card with defendant's name. Id. Returning to the apartment, the 
police further questioned Ms. Hill. Id. She denied that defendant was in the 
apartment, but permitted the police to look around. Id. In the bathroom, in plain 
view, they found torn checks belonging to Mr. Rigby in the toilet. Id. They found 
defendant in the bedroom and arrested and questioned him. Id. 
Defendant told the police he never entered the residence. Id. He initially 
denied driving the stolen car, but eventually claimed it was loaned to him. Id. On 
the bed, in plain view, the police saw a carton of Winston 100 cigarettes. Id. 
5 
Ms. Losee, stranded in New York by inclement weather for a week, called Mr. 
Carillo to pick up her car. R45 (Letter:l) Upon recovering her car when she arrived 
in Salt Lake City, Ms. Losee "immediately noticed the alignment was off, [her] iPod 
was broken... and the gas tank, [which she had filled before leaving] was empty/' 
Id. Because her gas tank was empty, she concluded that her car had been driven "at 
least 300 miles." R46 (Letter:2). About a week later, she noticed a "screeching" 
noise from the right front side of the car whenever she applied the brakes. R46 
(Letter:2). She was only able to afford to repair the car in April 2007, by which time 
the brake problem rendered the car "almost impossible to drive." Id. Her 
automobile mechanic informed her that repair of the right front brakes—replacement 
of brakes, caliper, and rotor—would necessarily require replacement of the left front 
brakes, too. Id. The alignment was corrected at the same time. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court implicitly found that there existed a causal relationship 
between defendant's possession and admitted driving of a stolen vehicle and the 
damages suffered by the owner of the car. Defendant admittedly drove the stolen 
car, if he did not steal it himself. He was found in possession of the car one day 
after the car was stolen. There was undisputed evidence that he recklessly drove the 
car, which had no operating problems before the car was stolen. The victim 
6 
discovered the first operational damage—"the alignment was off"—and the damage 
to her iPod immediately upon recovering the car. She discovered the second 
operational damage—"screeching" brakes—only a week later. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution to the victim of 
defendant's theft by receiving stolen property for damages to her alignment, brakes, 
and broken iPod, and for gas. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING 
RESTITUTION WHERE PECUNIARY DAMAGES WERE CAUSALLY RELATED 
TO DEFENDANT'S DRIVING A STOLEN CAR AND WERE SUFFICIENTLY 
FORESEEABLE TO BE RECOVERABLE IN A CIVIL ACTION FOR 
CONVERSION 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for 
the repairs to Ms. Losee's car and for the broken iPod. Aplt. Br. at 6-16. He argues 
that those damages were not the result of the criminal conduct to which he pled 
guilty. Aplt. Br. at 10. Nor, he continues, was "[any] evidence . . . presented to 
establish a sufficient nexus between [his] admitted conduct of possessing the vehicle 
and the damage found/' which was caused by Ms. Losee's continued operation of 
the car. Aplt. Br. at 6,13-15. Defendant misapprehends the scope of the law and his 
admissions, the range of his liability in committing the intentional tort of 
7 
conversion, and the discretion of the court to fashion an equitable award to the 
victim. 
Defendant pled guilty to attempted theft by receiving stolen property. R24, 
37. 
"A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (West Supp. 
2008). "[A] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he . . . engages in 
conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime [] and 
intends to commit the crime " Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (a)(b)(i) (West 
2004). 
In his plea affidavit, defendant acknowledged, as the factual basis of the plea, 
that he "drove a stolen vehicle/7 R25. At the plea hearing, defendant admitted that 
he "retained . . . a motor vehicle . . . knowing that the vehicle had been stolen." 
R96:8. 
At a restitution hearing at which defendant was present, the defense brought 
the victim's, Ms. Losee's, letter to the trial court's attention, and the court received 
8 
Ms. Losee's statement of damages. R43-49, 70; 87:4-5, 9. No other evidence was 
received. R87:l-17. Defendant "[did not] take issue with [Ms. Losee's] request[] for 
a tank of gas,"—"[h]e certainly drove it, and it had gas in it at some p o i n t . . . . " 
R87:5. Nor did he ever challenge charges for the alignment ($ 69.95), which Ms. 
Losee "immediately noticed" "[w]hen she finally reached Salt Lake/' R45 (Letter:l), 
48 (Receipt); 87:1-17. Defendant argued only that he should not be held accountable 
for the brake repairs and the broken iPod because he was not charged with stealing 
the car and damages to the brakes were normal wear and tear. R87:3-6,12-13. The 
trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $ 763.24—$ 539.24 
for "repairs to [Ms. Losee's] vehicle," $ 25.00 for a "tank of gas," and $ 199.00 for 
her broken iPod. R87:16; Order for Restitution, R71 (Addendum C). 
"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
chapter . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (West Supp. 2008). 
"'Criminal activities' means any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(l) (West Supp. 2008). 
9 
Defendant correctly states that "a defendant cannot be ordered to pay 
restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit 
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution/, State v. Hight, 
2008 UT App 118,13,182 P.3d 922 (citation omitted) "Furthermore, the restitution 
statute 'requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, 
much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution/" Id. (quoting State v. 
Watson, 1999 UT App 273, f 5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam)). Relying on these 
propositions, defendant argues that restitution was improperly ordered because his 
conviction or admitted criminal conduct failed to demonstrate a "sufficient nexus" 
or "causal relationship" to the automobile damages or the broken iPod. Aplt Br. at 
9-12. 
In support of his argument, defendant discusses three cases which, unlike this 
case, exemplify the absence of a sufficient nexus between criminal activity and the 
victim's damages. Aplt. Br. at 9-12. In State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,40 P.3d 1143, 
Mast was f ound with some of the articles taken in a burglary. Id. at H 3-4. She pled 
guilty to receiving stolen property, but never admitted possessing any of the other 
stolen property not found on her person. Id. at f 5 . This Court reversed the order of 
restitution for all the stolen goods, holding that, based on her plea only to receiving 
stolen property, Mast "[could] not be held to answer for all the damages resulting 
10 
from the burglary"— damages for items unconnected with Mast's admitted criminal 
activity. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Watson, the Court held that 
Watson could not be ordered to pay restitution relating to a murder where she had 
pled guilty only to obstruction of justice for selling the car she "allegedly" drove her 
codefendants to and from the crime scene. Id. at Ti 1-2. The Court held that the 
offense to which Watson pled guilty had no intrinsic relationship to the murder and 
could only be related to it through impermissible inferences concerning Watson's 
having driven the car or her state of mind. Id. at f l 4-6. See State v. Woods, 953 
P.2d 834, 836-37 (Wash. Ct. App.) (restitution improper where guilty plea to 
possession of stolen vehicle fixed time of possession and "it cannot be said that 'but 
for' Wood's possession of the stolen vehicle in September, the owner would not 
have lost the personal property located in the vehicle when it was stolen in 
August"), rev. denied, 969 P.2d 1064 (Wash. 1998). See also State v. Tetters, 914 P.2d 
784,784 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (same). Aplt. Br. at 13. 
In contradistinction to the defendants in those cases, defendant here admitted 
criminal activity causally related to the victim's damages. He admitted that he 
drove the car. R25; 87:5. At least part of the damage was immediately discovered 
when Ms. Losee recovered her car. R45 (Letterrl). And unlike the victims in Mast, 
Watson, and Woods, Ms. Losee has a viable civil action for all her damages in the 
11 
circumstances of this case, based on defendant's conversion of her property, as 
explained below. 
Defendant's "criminal activity" is firmly established by his guilty plea to theft 
by receiving stolen property. R23-36. Hight, 2008 UT App 118, \ 5 (recognizing 
that the "firmly established" requirement did not apply to any particular missing 
items in a burglary case—"it is only the initial crime for which liability must be 
legally certain"). 
By pleading guilty to attempted theft by receiving, defendant became subject 
to liability for conversion. "A conversion is an act of willful interference with a 
chattel, done without lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is 
deprived of its use and possession." Alfred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726,728 (Utah 1958). 
See Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, i f 4,9 ("'[T]he record in the case before us"—Corbitt 
pleaded guilty to possession of a vehicle he knew was stolen—"reflects that the 
State presented evidence which would support a civil conversion action against 
[Corbitt]") (quoting State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539,543 (Utah App. 1997)) (brackets in 
original). Accordingly, defendant was subject to liability for pecuniary damages. 
"'Pecuniary damages' means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market 
12 
value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed " Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (WestSupp. 2008).4 "[T]hedamages in an action for conversion 
are measured by the sum of the money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for all 
actual losses . . . sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's 
wrong/' Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, \ 9 (citation omitted) (brackets in original). 
"[T]he measure of damages is flexible, allowing the trial court to fashion an 
4
 The general sentencing statute, section 76-3-201, contains provisions that 
parallel those of Title 77, Chapter 38a. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West Supp. 
2008) (Addendum A). Through oversight, that section continues to define 
"pecuniary damages" somewhat differently than section 77-38a-102(6). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (West Supp. 2008). Section 76-3-201 states that 
'"[pecuniary damages' means all special damages, but not general damages " 
That section also omits the qualifying language in subsection 6 that follows the term 
"economic injury": "whether or not yet incurred." Section 77-38a-102(6). It also 
omits the concluding language of subsection 6 that follows the word "harmed": 
"and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or 
exemplary damages and pain and suffering." Id. The State does not contend that, 
for the purposes of this case, the language of section 76-3-201 (4) (a), as Utah courts 
have interpreted it, would lead to different results than section 77-38a-102(6). 
Nevertheless, it is the definition set out in section 77-38a-102(6) that represents the 
Legislature's intent. First, section 76-3-201 expressly directs that "[i]n determining 
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures 
as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, the Crime Victims Reparation Act." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(b) (West Supp. 2008). Further, the language of section 77-38a-
102(6), amended in 2005, reflects this Court's correction and clarification of the type 
of damages restitution is intended to reach. See Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, f l 18-28 
(Greenwood, J., concurring) (observing that defining "pecuniary damages" as "all 
special damages but not general damages" reversed "what the Legislature probably 
intended," but that Utah courts had appropriately interpreted the statute, focusing 
on "demonstrable pecuniary loss"—"actual economic harm"). 
13 
equitable award to the victim/7 Hight, 2008 UT App 118,13 (quoting Corbitt, 2003 
UT App 417, \ 9) (brackets in original). 
Thus, the only disputed question is whether defendant's criminal activity 
actually resulted in pecuniary damages. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (West 
Supp. 2008) (mandating that a person make restitution for "criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages"). Defendant argues that "[i]n this case, there was 
no evidence that showed a "sufficient nexus" between the defendant's conduct 
resulting from the short amount of time he admitted to possessing the vehicle and 
the brake repairs required on Ms. Losee's vehicle. Aplt. Br. at 13. But in fact and in 
law, defendant is liable to Ms. Losee for all her damages based on his conversion of 
her car and her iPod. 
In Hight, this Court awarded restitution in a burglary case even though Hight 
disputed taking other missing items. Hight 2008 UT App 118, f ! 1, 3. 
Nevertheless, the Court upheld restitution for the contemporaneously missing items 
because the burglary victim's testimony was unopposed at the restitution hearing. 
Id. at 16. The Court further noted that "[the defendant presented no witnesses at 
the hearing and presented] no record evidence on appeal that the homeowner's 
testimony was so lacking that "no reasonable person would take the view adopted 
by the trial court." Id. The facts are similar in this case. 
14 
Before Ms. Losee left on vacation her car "was running fine." R46 (Letter :2). 
Il I it" car apparently remained at Mr, Lariilo's home until it was stolen on I "t 11 niniy 
IL„, K M l L l l l l ' l 1 |, «">7 ' I III (M>ll< r l u i l l h l t l H M l l l r l l l l III ( HiSSChhllH I ( H tilt* Cdl I l i e 
following day, February 13. R45 (Letter1), Defender I ,.i In 11< i,l i li \ it ig tin* cvi! .i ml 
did not dispute respoi isibility for a full tank of gas. R25; 87:5. Ms. Losee concluded 
that her car had. been driven "at least 300 .miles/' R45 (Letter:2). Mr. Carillo took the 
~~r back to his residence. R45 (Letter:!). There is no evidence that the car was u ; 
ine folic*. , . _^.. .u. i ^see arriv^a m odii Lake \ av '~— 
s .^:g. . . 
n o d Wd5 L)l ' 
'the right front side of the car' whenever she applied tl te brakes. R46 (Letter:2). She 
was only able to afford to repair the car in April 2007, by which "time ti^ b: 
problem rendered the car "almost impossible to d rive/' x t " aufomol " 
n Led iai dcinforn tedl Ler that repair of the right froi i tl: xa kes—replacement of bra!"*" 
calipei, and rotoi iwuihl necessarily in i|iim replau'iiu ill nil llu1 lht II I in»in I hrakis, 
too. Id. The alignment was corrector! r»t the -^rr.r -
As noted, defendant was at 'the restitution hearing. R70. However, he did not 
testify. R87:l-17, Ms. Losee's letter, receipt for the auto damages, and statemen: ™ 
the broken iPod, were brought to the trial court's attention and received. R4S-ff i?$l 
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87:4-5, 9. The letter also indicated that Ms. Losee had spoken to a witness to 
defendant's driving pattern: "I was told my car was finally recovered when 
someone reported seeing it being driven recklessly and throwing stolen checks out 
of the window." R45 (Letter:l). No other evidence was received. R87:l-17. 
Defendant "[did not] take issue with [Ms. Losee's] request[] for a tank of gas,"— 
"[h]e certainly drove it, and it had gas in it at some point " R87:5. Nor did he 
ever challenge charges for the alignment ($ 69.95), which Ms. Losee "immediately 
noticed" "[w]hen she finally reached Salt Lake." R45 (Letter:l), 48 (Receipts), 87:1-
17. 
Like the facts in Eight, which established a contemporaneous taking of 
disputed items at the time of the burglary, the foregoing facts establish a sufficient 
nexus between defendant's admitted driving and undisputed evidence as to his 
recklessness on the one hand, and the unchallenged damage to the car's alignment, 
discovered almost immediately defendant's use, and the brake problem, discovered 
one week later, on the other hand. Compare State v. Sellers,709 P.2d 768,770 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1986) (evidence existed "from which the court could find that any damage to 
the vehicle which occurred during and after defendant's unauthorized use resulted 
from his "criminal activities" and is "pecuniary damage") with Woods, 953 P.2d at 
16 
837 (no causal relation between missing personalty from vehicle stolen one moi rth 
before the defendant admitted possess .en \ cu * Je). 
IMiirixii"! in in in) i xdteiLial; _ damage ID lite I nil ^caused ty 
Losee's continued drivini» nl Inn i ill Ini (VHI iinwilh-i »ill< i slit1 d i s annu l III 
rio^xCxiixS prp^* cxtuxxu/LitaDle to defendant. In State ' h IU' I ' l( r>40 I * 2d ri. V) 
(I Jtcih App. 1997), the defendant was caught with a stolen car. Id. at 540 The car1 
was impounded,, but, because 'the police made a mistake in. transcribing the vehicle's 
.^nuncation nurr he car was sold and the victim was unable to recover it. Id. 
< i • •:acred to pay restitution thai iikludtd costs 
>.rera\~*' • ' ." I hi* appellili11 MMIII upheld ll'iis uuld i>f 
restitution, concluding tl Lat tl te damages for defendant's intention •* I *<M1 mmi' m »t 
reduced by either the superseding or comparative negligence of the police. Id. at 
543-45. 
Finally, the cour t s order for pecuniary damages for the broken iPod was 
piopci'ly within Mir IILII UMIIIS ilisuvlion in itus case. Even assuming that 
defendant did m I strnl Ms I •nsec'sriir himself; his possession ofil i i .i". vvnlnii one 
day of that theft. R45 (Letter:!). Fie admitted driving line1 rnr .ind tlino exists 
iiiidisputed evidence that he drove recklessly. It is entirely foreseeable that one 
driving a car in a reckless manner while tossing the burglary victim's checks from 
1 7 . 
the car window would handle any other goods belonging to the victims in the same 
manner. See State v. Hiett, 115 P.3d 274,277 (Wash 2005) (en banc) ("[W]e cannot say 
that it was unforeseeable that a person guilty of taking a motor vehicle would steal 
personal property in the vehicle "). 
In sum, the trial court properly ordered ordered restitution for all damages to 
Ms, Losee's car.5 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the restitution order. 
Respectfully submitted February / / , 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
5
 Defendant also claims that "the sentencing court's order violates due 
process because due process requires more than an inference of responsibility. 
Aplt. Br. at 15-16. Because the court's order was proper, the State declines to 
address this claim. 
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§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allow ed— 
Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with-or without an admission of committing' the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which, a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and 
medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) ''Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of 
an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniar}? 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed 
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, tne cuun Mian n, 
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims V 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses'if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime, 
(b) The court may not order the defendant lv pay ;••• <;ra,.>:i of g^ v-. rnim'iiu*. :.ra:i pur 
tation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraounn *>r t>n a -jbsoquijni failure *- a; i - rs a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall 
be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the 
county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it 
§ 76-3-201 
may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any 
governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to the 
county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Sec-
tion 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 
64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by 
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs and 
medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses incurred 
by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate 
qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical 
and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection 
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall 
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter the 
reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county shall 
reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under 
Subsection (6Xa). 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 
1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81, 
§ 1; Laws 1992, c 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 17, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. I l l , § 1, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 
1995, c. 337, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 
40, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3, eff. 
April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, e. 270, § 15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 
2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 2003; Laws 2006, c. 208, § 1, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 
2007, c. 339, § 3, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 353, § 9, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 151, § 1, eff. 
May 5, 2008. 
§ 7 6 - 4 - 1 0 1 . Attempt—Elements of offense 
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if he: 
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the crime; and 
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or 
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts 
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that 
result. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it 
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-4-101; Laws 2004, c. 154, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
§ 76-6-408. Receiving stolen property''—Duties of pawnbrokers 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the owner, 
knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of i t 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection. (1) is presumed in the case of an actor 
who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense 
charged; or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or represen-
tative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to 
require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate 
next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting 
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of 
Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to 
have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the 
defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or 
collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, 
or representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, 
or withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, received, or 
obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do'"not apply to scrap metal processors as. defined in 
Section 76-10-901. 
(8) As used in this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or 
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same: property back again to 
the pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security 
on the property and takes.or receives the personal property into his possession and who 
sells the unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for m-*"- : ^ ^ ' >i -'^r persi>: d 
property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or r Lie or ending ^n thi- ^er>irii> »f 
the property. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-408; Laws 1979, c. 71, § 1; Laws 1993. - 102, § I; Law* 204, c. 2<>9, § J'i, 
eff. Jan 1, 2005. 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other 
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or 
without an admission of committing the criminal conduct 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the condition 
that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make restitution to the 
victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendants criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical 
expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the defendant 
will enter a plea of guilty or no contest 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition 
that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecu-
tion and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following 
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any agreement 
by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where charges are 
dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, 
insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for expenses to a 
governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an 
offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that 
the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a bounty 
hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate investiga-
tive action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has been com-
menced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 3, 
eff. May 2,2005. 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime ias provided in this chapter, or for conduct for * 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and 
in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all 
losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdic-
tion orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing 
or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, 
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the 
court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include 
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by 
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating 
to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in 
accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in 
bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to 
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim 
and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, 
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; . 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropri-
ate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time of 
sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole, 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an 
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
Laws 2001, c. 137, § 8, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 13, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2002, c 185, 
§ 51, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 96, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
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District Ct No. Q7190164« 
DA Case No. 7003136 
Charge /Date Occurred; Theft, February 13,2007 
Dear Sir of Madam: 
.. This letter is to advise you that you may be eligible 1D receive restitution in 
Ihev.abovweisrenoed case. If you feci lefltrtiition ia owed to you, you must 
provide ow- office with pepper documentation. Please scod any records you have 
with, a'brief OOYEC letter that states the total amount you ace requesting to 
substantiate your restitution claim to the address below (Le. copies of receipts, 
"bids or olber written documentation. a£ your out-of-pocket expenses). Be advised 
that vie may also lecover restitution on behalf of your insurance company if 
applicable. 
The Court has only allowed a certain amount of time to provide restitution, 
so please resooitfl mumdi&tetv. I must reoedyc TOUT claim and verifying 
documeuti on or before June 1L 2007 for anbmftUl to the Couit. If I do not 
'lecexve the necessary infanua£ioa before that time, I wflL assume that you do not 
-wish to make a restitution claim and -will so inform the Court. 
FLEASE NOTIFY ME IMMEDIATELY WHETHER YOU WISH 
TO MAKE A CLAIM OR NOT. If you have any questions, on foi injunctions 
regarding what documentatioQ the court needs before awarding restitution please 
contact me at (801) 166-7803 or fax dcrtaOed Mentation, to (801) 531-4176. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matte*. 
Sincerely, 




To Whom R ^ y Concern: 
T am writing in regards to the «fnu> that was coinimtejediigjuiastiiiBmPebniary 
20(37- AB you may know, my car was stolen fir Dm my ftiend HectorBogar terrillo's 
home-while I was vacan" omng ia ft aly. I l&fi.my car parked at his bouse 901 wonld sot 
have to payibr parking at me airport. wbilB I was away. I distinctly remember Jockmg. 
my car doocra and giving the keys to Bogar, which be then hung OIL a rack in his JriGchea, 
From what I have heard, Bogar's house was broken into, tny keys-were taken, and ray car 
was usedfopacknp all to valuahlBfto^wcTestialaifoBniBoBar's home alosngwiuia, 
tewDtherhDmratlialwcr&biurglaiized. 1 was told my cat was finally leoorasd whan, 
someooejepaited seeing it being driven reaklesBly and throwing stolen checkB out the 
window 
Because this incident happened just hows before the TtoQey Square shooting 
Bogar was unable to finish filing ajeport Officers were at his house when they got & call 
about the abootmg and understandably bad 60 leave right away. Also, because Bogar was 
oof tbe owner of fee car he was told he could art report it as staten and that I had to 
physically see Chat the cat was missing and ffle toe report myBelf. He explained that I 
wasc^rftheooimjtrysorm I received 
the news that my oar had been stolen just hours before my flight from Italy to New Yaik 
and so I wasimable to make-any pbionec^ WbaiLlieachedNew Yoxkl. 
affidttfly filed the report myaelf by jbonewitii a deputy and then I also filed a report 
withmyinflii£»ttoe cempany. 
I was only supposed to spend one nigfrtiti New York and tea fly bade to Bait 
Lake but due to aJmj^ snowstorm Jet Blue liad to shutdown, Although. I was not flying 
with Jet Blue the shut down did affect me because I was flying standby and all tbe Jet 
Bine ticket holders were baying all available tickets. As a result I was stranded in New. 
Ya± forces week. TliankfulJy, rhadaplacetasbiy, biJtpayingl«rrDeaisa(ad 
transpccTtatioQ to andffeam the airpart for one week was quite expensive, notto mennan I 
bad just spent aU inysavings in Italy. On top of that Iliad just used all my vacation time 
from wenk in Italy so I had no vacation time left for tie diy&I was in New Yoric 
Iieoeived a call that my car had been found while I was sriU in New Yaik so J 
called Bogar and another friend Zacfa Jensen to pick up my car foe me so 2 was not able to 
inspect the car myself to see if there was any damage or if any of my belongings were 
missing. I kept the report open, with my insaranoe company untfl. I was able to physically 
inspect if myself 
When I finally reached SaltLake I immediately noticed the aligns 
IPOD was broken and my 1POD FMtranamitter w » missing, jnyed collection was 
noticeably smaller, my coat was gone* and the gas tank was empty ([had rilled it just 
before I let) tor Italy because I was afraid I would spend all nay money and wouldn't have 
enougb money for gas). I called my insurance company to mfaroo them of the ooadition 
of my car and what items were missing or broken and they informed me that I had a. 
^ ^ * I * CZD 
31000 deductible and the cost of all these iteoia was not over $ 1D00 sol would W a 
C O 
-T=f 
responsible Jar replacing tfiem. I defied my claim wife them at that time. 
About a weeiLEtferlnotijce^ajBcroec^ 
every time I pushed on my brakes. BecmiseIl)adjiutiBtiimc<L4nm 
stranded in New Yoak fat i week (unpaid) and I was a student at (hat time I was enable to-
aifbid any Topaiis. FY1; my ticket to Italy was ptiacticailly ftee because I went with a 
Mend of mine-who vradts for the aiztincs and while in Baly-we stayed with unload of 
ours from higb school, otherwise I newer would been able ba aflbrd a trip to Italy. 
In April I was finally able to ailbrd repairs facmy car andby that-time the- s 
problem with, my takes'made it ahnotf. impossible to drive. The mechanic informed "me 
that they had to replace (he "brakes, caliper, and to tor on my front passenger side andra 
top erf that they had to repair the driver' a side air "well became they couldVt cepair one 
aide without repairing the other. They also -fixedmy alignment at mat time. I feel that 
theae repairs were needed because it was dnvea recklesBly while it was stolen. It was 
ruoDDirigfmDbcrbrellefl Alsc^TwauseBtleartafuIl tank of gaswasusedllaiawitwaa. 
dxivejLatleaat300mLles orrnaie. 
I amreqneariDg restitution for all repairs ifafirt weie done on my oar and all items 
bSatweieeirtbcriidaffltig or broken. As yon cam ted by this letter this cranehaAquita an. 
impact oo my life nnanciaOy, emotionally, and physically. Also, I am requesting thai the 
defendant be piraisbed to tte Iamalaw-abtdMf^citLeeaandlmid 
it unfair that I ihouldhave to pay foe someone site's mistakes. Hopefully "by "hexng 
pumshed he'll learn mini MB miBtakes and not become a repeat offender. I would hale 
for another person to have to gp thraujjla the oidealthatliehaBjnitmcmroagh-
r haw attached a.liat of items I am Teanesting restitution for included a receipt for 
repaira done on my car and approximate values fbr most of the item* that were missing or 








IPOD and AcceaBorte* 
IPOD NAN04GB (broken) 
IPOD H1UP EM transmitter 
CD>9 




Bveryuttug But the Gitl-Amplrfioi Heart 
Tegan and Sam-So Jealous 
Bloc Party-Silent Alarm. 
David Gray-White Ladder 
EVB8cdJan00Ufi 


















Eap a 1-38 KWTH / 1-38 X B I i a 
In. Apr I S , 2007 1 1 : 2 2 a™ t JJ ^  e t i c i c B 3 H V D 1 C E * 
Out Apx 13j 2007 11 :35 am 
Sold l b 
CAMIB LDSEB 






0 4 BYDKDAI SLSN3BA 
A30M&D 
I n : 0 Out: 5 2 , 6 6 3 
3a USIOM* l.oo memm OOM?IJBTH n o o muBi 1G9.U O.OO O.DO 1S9.9B 
3a mars, i.oamaxunx maxa o.oo a.ea o.oo o.oo 
IHESB BRAKE PADS / SHOES ARE WftRRMTTBD FOB 2 4 , 0 0 0 MILES OK 24 MOUTHS
 f 
WHICBEVER OOHBS F I R S T . S I B SACK FOR DETAILS. 
a.oa Bffi«E B D c-.oa <i,oa O . M D.ao-
3.OQ w r a n a m coo**? Jf l .n a.on O.DO J7.aa 
2.00 BBJUKI OlLiHDB. CmOfT) 7*1.U O.OO O.DO ISt.SB 
jaraiir i .oo Auaaaon: 4 mmci a.oa ss .sa ocoo* «».S3 
THE VEHICLE. MJGMSBNT PERFORMED BY 7 B I S BIG O STORE I S WAREARTTBD. SEE BACK 
OS1 THIS INVOICE EQR DETAILS. 
8BOP orffBoin 1.00 Bsny B T X B U U 13.W a.oa O . M 
a c 4 «*««k«N*22. Kip.Xitta nuthV 
SLgnatuci:. 
Cftsh Check Card Charge Partas 436.76 
0 00 0.00 539.24 D.OO Labor: 6 9 • 9 5 
Subtotal* 506.71 
<**=*•= Saiea Tar: 32.53 
3la**tx>c»i , ^ t a l : 539.24 
The Apple Stare (U-S-)" iPodnano Page I of 2 
























3t^^cd §> ^ j ^ P f t u Select T sateci Se*e 
tjEp& 4 
© Ftofrfl having. ^ a*d H ty iun« 1TO1 f f f i F i » (Pa* flift psctautPS far Father* Day. 
Ouertfiw CMnpan*<9)pi»l* w w i y 
SG$ J Up to I/KKJ aonnji Choo*e*2GB,4G&. a 9GB 
Pert neno and carry yaur ferorite 
mine BvaiywtwtB—pLiii 
potfcaslBvajidcboote, photo*. 
rontatfE, calendar, md Iteu.1 
vj?y Eran brighter color a crew 
^"* Ycur alfcum wU photo*, a nd mora 
flam even more brlltence flian Is 
la a. 1 &ftuh cofer display ttiars 







District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Cristina P. Ortega, #9567 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 




SALT LAKE COUNT? 
"Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
COREY EDWARD HARVELL 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION 
Case No.071901648 
Judge Judith S. Atherton 
Based on the State's Motion, and good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant, COREY EDWARD 
HARVELL, is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $763.24 to Cami Losee for car 
repairs, to include brake repair, gasoline, and a broken IPOD NANO. In addition, the 
defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,450.00 to Gary Rigby for 
property that was not recovered, including jewelry, a flat screen television set, and video 






- Ouo . 
DATED this I day of OCTOBER, 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
^ I t 
